

26 Nov 56

MEMO FOR RECORD

25X1X600070027-1

SUBJECT: Luncheon Conversation with [REDACTED]

From a singularly rambling discussion which touched on a great variety of points, the following maybe worth noting for the record:,

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1. [REDACTED] believes that the break which appears to be developing between Tito and the Kremlin is real and very far reaching. It must have come somewhat as a surprise to both parties in view of the way things have been developing in previous months. [REDACTED] is glad that he did not make the trip to Yugoslavia to confer with Tito, as originally planned for last month. The timing would have been completely wrong. He is not sure whether it might still be advisable to make such a trip, and is reluctant to do so unless he has some clearer lead than he now sees. I suggested that he might talk to Ambassador Riddleberger when he returns and perhaps get some suggestions for an approach to Tito and his entourage. [REDACTED] said that the [REDACTED] apparently still is interested in having him make the trip.

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2. [REDACTED] still believes, as he has consistently over the past year at least, that the Soviet leadership is probably strongly motivated by fear. He believes that they must have grave doubts about their ability to contain the series of international brush fires which have been started. He feels that this would be an ideal time for the US to approach an overall negotiation with the Soviets with a view to seeking a global settlement. Following somewhat the lines of the LONDON OBSERVER he suggested that the US might offer to give up any one/overseas base of the Soviets' choice in return for the withdrawal of troops of the USSR from Hungary. The offer could be held open for each of the 5 or 6 other satellites in turn.

3. In connection with the difficulties which the Soviet leaders may be experiencing in maintaining their firmness of control, [REDACTED] was greatly interested in the evidences of discontent and questioning among the intellectuals and the youth. He noted that there are a great many students from the satellite countries studying in the USSR, many of whom have of course a very different view of the West than the average Russian student would be able to obtain. He feels that this interchange would be extremely fruitful for the development of ~~thousands~~ in the minds of the Russian students.

doubts

DOCUMENT NO. 27
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
IT DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1992
DATE: 2 JUNE 82 REVIEWER: 103430

4. With respect to German unification, he suggested that the problem of the Oder -Neisse line be put off for a period of 25 years, at which time there would be a plebescite. Of course at any time before that date it might be possible for the Poles and the Germans to arrive at a compromise settlement of the boundary. He feels that no Polish government could hope to survive if it renounced the Silesian area. Any major rectification of the East Polish frontier can hardly be anticipated but it would be essential in a real settlement that the USSR should give up Koenigsberg. *True*

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5. [REDACTED] does not regard the change in Molotov's status as a demotion. Three facts must be taken together:


- a. Molotov's prominent appearance at the Gomulka reception;
- b. His designation as Czar of Russian culture;
- c. Appointment to the Ministry of State Control, which is by no means a perfunctory office.

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These add up, in [REDACTED] opinion, neither to a demotion nor to a Stalinist reversion but rather suggest an effort by at least the oldguard elements, if not the whole of the collective leadership to prepare for the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee. Specifically, the effort is being made to prevent Khrushchev from packing that meeting entirely with his own political supporters.


25X1X6 discussed the Alsop-Kennan article in the SATURDAY EVENING POST. [REDACTED] feels that much of Kennan's analysis is excellent, although he failed to anticipate the Soviet resort to force in Hungary.

25X1X6 7. Concerning the "erosion of despotism" view of Mr. Kennan, [REDACTED] feels that this has always been conceived in essentially western form. Mr. Kennan sees the gradual drift of Russia towards something like a Western European type of Democratic Socialism. [REDACTED] feels that this is quite impossible in a country which brought to the top such individuals as Khrushchev and Stalin. 25X1X6 [REDACTED] own generalized prophecy would be: First, a period of "turmoil and confusion" such as has frequently occurred in Russian history, followed by the emergence of a new dictator, probably the type of the man on horseback.

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8. In conclusion, [REDACTED] asked whether anything he could do would be of use in evaluating the critical situation. I suggested that he develop in writing for the possible attention of the Director a suggestion he made at the very beginning of the Hungarian crisis and which he repeated today, viz., the denunciation by the US of the Hungarian peace treaty on the grounds of its

violation by the Soviets. He feels that this step would be legally and morally sound and would strengthen our position vis-a-vis the ~~USSR~~ ^{25X1A9a} in relation to the other satellites with which we have treaty relations.  agreed to amplify these views in writing.

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Chief, SRS/DDI